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Public policy and human rights
Jan Oster*
The article examines the impact of human rights on the application of public
policy clauses in private international law, a topic which is of increasing
significance in a “global village” with fragmented human rights standards. It
argues that public policy clauses should not be applied restrictively insofar as
they serve to protect human rights. Instead, the principle of proportionality
and the merely indirect horizontal effect of human rights in private law
relationships prevent the use of substantive public policy as a “floodgate” to
impose domestic values on foreign cases. Furthermore, the study shows that
the human rights-compliant application of public policy clauses is subject to
full scrutiny by the European Court of Human Rights, except in cases where
domestic courts do not refuse recognition of a foreign judgment based on
public policy for judgments originating from another European Convention
on Human Rights state. The article contributes to the theoretical and
doctrinal analysis of public policy as a private international law concept.
Keywords: public policy; human rights; EU law; private international law;
Brussels Ia Regulation; Court of Justice of the European Union; European
Court of Human Rights
A. Introduction: aim, scope, and method of this article
In the “global village”1 the world has become, human rights exert an increasing
influence on private law cases transgressing jurisdictional boundaries. Because
of its openness and flexibility, particularly the concept of public policy (or, in con-
tinental terminology, ordre public) has proven to be a gateway to take on board
human rights concerns when applying private international law. The same
applies to provisions which do not expressly provide a public policy exception,
but which allow courts to refuse compliance with private international law rules
on human rights grounds.2 Yet, whilst court decisions have mostly focussed on
© 2015 Taylor & Francis
* Assistant Professor for EU Law and Institutions, Faculty of Humanities, Leiden University.
Email: j.s.oster@hum.leidenuniv.nl. The article is basedon apresentationgiven at the conference
on “TheLegal Challenges of SocialMedia toFreedomofExpression” inDecember 2013. I wish
to thank the organisers and participants of this conference, especially Dr Lorna E Gillies and Dr
David Mangan, and two anonymous reviewers of the Journal of Private International Law.
1Marshall McLuhan is credited as having coined this term; see A Giddens, Sociology (7th
ed, Polity, 2013) (revised and updated with Philip W Sutton) 767.
2For example, see Art 20 of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction discussed in K Trimmings & PR Beaumont “Article 20 of the 1980
Hague Abduction Convention” (2014) Journal of Comparative Law 66–88.
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the effect of the right to a fair trial on procedural public policy,3 the impact of
human rights on substantive public policy has rarely been subject to distinct scru-
tiny by European courts so far.4
This article examines the conceptions of public policy clauses, develops the
distinction between procedural and substantive public policy, and analyses the
impact of human rights on these public policy clauses. Particular questions arise
regarding the level of judicial scrutiny. First, the standard of scrutiny to be
applied by a domestic court when applying foreign law or recognising foreign
judgments, and secondly, the scope of judicial review of the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) in cases where the (non-)application of public policy
clauses is alleged to have violated human rights.
It is the aim of this article to examine the impact of human rights on the appli-
cation of public policy clauses in private international law. The study aims to con-
tribute to the theoretical and doctrinal analysis of public policy as a private
international law concept, the horizontal effect of human rights, and the standard
of judicial review concerning human rights violations in private international law.
It will establish the following tenets:
1. Insofar as they serve to protect human rights, public policy clauses should
not be applied restrictively. The unqualified obligation to protect human
rights does not allow for an “attenuated effect” of human rights as public
policy.
2. The principle of proportionality and the merely indirect horizontal effect of
human rights in private law relationships prevent the use of substantive
public policy as a “floodgate” to impose domestic values on foreign cases.
3. The human rights-compliant application of public policy clauses by courts
of Member States to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) is subject to full scrutiny by
3See, eg, Case C-7/98 Krombach [2000] ECR I-1395; Pellegrini v Italy Judgment of 20 July
2001 App No 30882/96; Government of the United States of America v Montgomery (No 2)
[2004] UKHL 37; Maronier v Larmer [2002] EWCA Civ 774; Al-Bassam v Al-Bassam
[2004] EWCA Civ 857; Mark v Mark [2004] EWCA Civ 168; SA Marie Brizzard et
Roger International v William Grant & Sons Ltd (No 2) 2002 SLT 1365.
4G Cuniberti and I Rueda, “Abolition of Exequatur” (2011) 75 Rabels Zeitschrift 286, 313;
see European Commission, Report to the European Parliament, the Council and the Euro-
pean Economic and Social Committee on the application of Council Regulation (EC) No
44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and com-
mercial matters, COM(2009) 174, 4: “As to public policy, the study shows that this ground
is frequently invoked but rarely accepted. If it is accepted, this mostly occurs in exceptional
cases with the aim of safeguarding the procedural rights of the defendant”. Notable excep-
tions are, for example, Wagner and JMWL v Luxembourg Judgment of 28 June 2007
App No 76240/01; Ammdjadi v Germany Judgment of 9 March 2010 App No 51625/08;
Oppenheimer v Cattermole [1976] AC 249; Kuwait Airways Corporation v Iraqi
Airways Company and others [2002] UKHL 19.






































the ECtHR, except in cases where domestic courts do not refuse recog-
nition to judgments originating from another Convention state on
grounds of public policy.
B. Conceptions of public policy and the impact of human rights
1. The conceptions of public policy
Public policy is not only a vague, but also a ubiquitous concept. Private inter-
national law provides exemptions to both the application of the lex causae by a
domestic court and to the recognition of foreign judgments (exequatur), if the
application of foreign law or the recognition of the foreign judgment would be
incompatible with the public policy of the forum, or contrary to the public
policy of the state where recognition is sought, respectively. In short, public
policy clauses apply in the frameworks of both the recognition of foreign judg-
ments and the determination of the applicable law. In the European multi-level
system both EU law5 and domestic law6 provide such private international law
rules and, consequently, public policy clauses. Public policy clauses are therefore
the ultimate expression of national sovereignty, allowing a state to preserve the
fundamental values of its legal system.7 They open the gates for clashes
between the interests of the state and those of individuals.8
If states have agreed to a system of mutual recognition and reciprocity – for
instance, via an international agreement or, as is the case in the EU, via suprana-
tional regulations – they are even under an international obligation to recognise a
foreign court’s decisions, or to apply foreign law. A decision of a requesting state
thus takes legal effect within the enforcing state, subject only to limited grounds of
5See Art 45(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judg-
ments in civil and commercial matters (recast), [2012] OJ L351/1 (“Brussels Ia”); Art 22(a)
of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the
matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, [2003] OJ
L338/1 (“Brussels IIa”); Art 24 of Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December
2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and
cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, [2009] OJ L7/1.
6Under English law, see Re Macartney [1921] 1 Ch 522 on the common law; s 9(1) and (2)
(f) of the Administration of Justice Act 1920 on judgments obtained in superior courts in
other British dominions; s 4(1)(a)(v) of the Foreign Judgments (reciprocal enforcement)
Act 1933; Adams v Cape Industries Plc [1990] Ch. 433 CA (Civ Div). Under German
law, see s 328(4) of the Civil Procedure Code.
7A Briggs, The Conflict of Laws (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, 2013) 209; HPMeidanis,
“Public Policy andOrdre Public in the Private International Law of the EU: Traditional Pos-
itions and Modern Trends” (2005) European Law Review 95, 97.
8JJ Fawcett, “The Impact of Article 6(1) of the ECHR on Private International Law” (2007)







































refusal. Hence, the enforcing state partly loses its sovereign power over the full
control of actions to be taken on its territory.9 In such systems of mutual recog-
nition and reciprocity, the key question underlying the application of public
policy clauses is therefore to what extent states have to mutually trust each
other’s legal systems, and to what extent they may invoke their own legal prin-
ciples if they do not trust the home state control.10
Being able to refuse recognition of foreign judgments on the basis of public
policy (non-recognition based on public policy), such as under Article 45(1)(a)
of the Brussels Ia Regulation, serves two functions. First, preventing a breach
of the procedural public policy of the forum when the procedure in the foreign
litigation falls short of the fundamental procedural standards of the enforcing
state. Secondly, upholding the forum’s public policy when the merits of a
foreign court’s decision whose recognition is sought fall short of the fundamental
substantive standards of the enforcing state (substantive public policy). Contrary
to the European Commission’s initial intention and to several recent pieces of
EU legislation,11 the 2012 recast of the Brussels I Regulation did not abolish
the control of substantive public policy.12 As will be shown in this article, this
has to be welcomed: Public policy is a necessary instrument for the respect of
human rights and should not be deleted in international instruments on recognition
and enforcement of decisions. The “hyper-efficiency”13 of automatic
9See S Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, 2011)
663.
10See S Peers, ibid 685. Compare Recital 16 of the Brussels I Regulation and Opinion 2/13
[2014] Accession to the ECHR, EU:C:2014:2454 [191–192].
11See European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of
the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and
commercial matters (Recast) of 14.12.2010, COM(2010) 748 final, 6; Regulation (EC) No
805/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 creating a Euro-
pean Enforcement Order for uncontested claims, [2004] OJ L143/15; Regulation (EC) No
1896/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 creating a
European order for payment procedure, [2006] OJ L399/1; Regulation (EC) No 861/2007
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 establishing a European
Small Claims Procedure, [2007] OJ L199/1; Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18
December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions
and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, [2009] OJ L7/1.
12Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12
December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in
civil and commercial matters (recast), [2012] OJ L351/1. Under Art 45(a) of this Regu-
lation, the recognition of a judgment shall be refused upon the application of any interested
party “if such recognition is manifestly contrary to public policy (ordre public) in the
Member State addressed”.
13P Kinsch, “Private International Law Topics before the European Court of Human Rights”
(2011) Yearbook of Private International Law 37, 48; see also P Beaumont and E Johnston,
“Abolition of the Exequatur in Brussels I: Is a Public Policy Defence Necessary for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights?” (2010) IPRax 105, 108, and “ Can Exequatur be Abolished in
Brussels I whilst Retaining a Public Policy Defence?” (2010) Journal of Private






































enforceability of judgments or orders in the other Member States prevents the
enforcing state from taking on board international, but especially domestic,
human rights concerns.14
In contrast to the use of public policy at the recognition stage, public policy at
the applicable law stage, for example Article 21 Rome I Regulation and Article 26
Rome II Regulation,15 only relates to the forum’s substantive public policy, but not
to its procedural public policy, because it is the forum courts that conduct the pro-
ceedings. Although the forum courts may be under an obligation to apply foreign
law, they have to examine whether the application of the foreign law would lead to
a result that violates domestic public policy.
2. Human rights as public policy
Public policy includes “the fundamental moral convictions or policies” of a
society that are “of such paramount importance that [their] non-application to
the facts of the case would be intolerable”.16 It encompasses those rules of law
that are “regarded as essential in the legal order” of the state concerned.17 In
any democratic society, the respect for human rights ranks among those fundamen-
tal principles. Such human rights as a state has to observe are enshrined in dom-
estic constitutional law, in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU
International Law 249; G Cuniberti, “Abolition de l’exequatur et présomption de protection
des droits fondamentaux” (2014) Revue critique de droit international privé 103, para 61.
14See, for example, Case C-491/10 PPU Aguirre Zarraga v Pelz [2010] ECR I-14247 [49];
Povse v Austria Judgment of 18 June 2013 App No 3890/11 on the application of Arts 11
and 42 of the Brussels IIa Regulation which abolishes the public policy defence in certain
child abduction cases, discussed in PR Beaumont, K Trimmings, LWalker and J Holliday,
“Child Abduction: Recent Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights” (2015)
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 39–63.
15Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June
2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), [2008] OJ L177/8; Regu-
lation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on
the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II), [2007] OJ L199/40. See also
Art 12 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1259/2010 of 20 December 2010 implementing
enhanced cooperation in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation,
[2010] OJ L343/10; Art 35 of Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforce-
ment of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of
succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession, [2012] OJ L201/
107. Under domestic law, see, for example, s 14(3)(a)(i) UK Private International Law (Mis-
cellaneous Provisions) Act 1995; Art 6 of the German Introductory Act to the Civil Code;
Art 6 of the Dutch Civil Code, Book 10; Art 20 of the Belgian Private International Law
Code; Art 17 of the Swiss Federal Act on Private International Law; Art 6 of the Austrian
Private International Law Act.
16O Kahn-Freund, “Reflections on Public Policy in the English Conflict of Laws”, Trans-
actions for the Year 1953 (The Grotius Society) (1954), 39, 40.







































(EUChFR), if applicable,18 and in international agreements to which a state is a
party, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
and the ECHR.19 Those human rights intrinsically belong to the values public
policy clauses aim to protect. This follows, first, from the nature of human
rights as objectives a state commits itself to, and secondly, as regards the funda-
mental rights of the EUChFR in particular, from their status as primary EU
law.20 Thirdly, the fact that human rights constitute an aspect of public policy is
even stipulated – in a declaratory manner – in some private international law codi-
fications themselves.
As regards the first point, Article 2 ICCPR provides that each State Party to the
Covenant “undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory
and subject to its jurisdiction” the rights recognised in the Covenant. Similarly,
Article 1 ECHR imposes an obligation upon the Convention states to “secure to
everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I
of [the] Convention”. Similar provisions can be found in domestic law. For
instance, Section 6(3)(a) of the UK Human Rights Act 1998 bars a public auth-
ority, including a court or tribunal, from acting in a way which is incompatible
with a Convention right. In the same vein, Article 1(3) of the German Basic
Law provides that the fundamental rights of the Basic Law shall bind the legisla-
ture, the executive and the judiciary as directly applicable law. None of these pro-
visions makes a distinction according to the legal issue concerned; hence they
apply to the interpretation and application of private international law as to any
other area of law.21 To be sure, the area of law or the precise questions a court
has to decide on can make a difference as to the way human rights have to be
applied. It does make a difference, for example, whether human rights apply in
their vertical effect in a state-citizen relationship governed by public law or in
their merely indirect horizontal effect in a case between private individuals.22
Moreover, in relation to child abduction cases, the human right to respect for
“family life” is interpreted differently when the court having jurisdiction over
the merits is hearing the case from when the court of the requested state has to
18Art 51(1) EUChFR provides the rule for the applicability of the Charter.
19See Oppenheimer v Cattermole [1976] AC 249 at 277–278 (per Lord Cross); Kuwait
Airways Corporation v Iraqi Airways Company and others [2002] UKHL 19 [28] (per
Lord Nicholls), [114] (per Lord Steyn), [139] (per Lord Hope); Al-Bassam v Al-Bassam
[2004] EWCA Civ 857 [45]; Government of the United States of America v Montgomery
(No 2) [2004] UKHL 37; J Fawcett and J Carruthers, Cheshire, North & Fawcett,
Private International Law (14th ed, Oxford University Press, 2008) 145.
20See also S Peers, supra n 9, 709. Compare the Opinion of A-G Kokott in Case C-296/08
PPU Santesteban Goicoechea [2008] ECR I-6307 [48]; Opinion of A-G Bot in Case C-66/
08 Kozłowski [2008] ECR I-6041 [105]; and the Opinion of A-G Bot in Case C-123/08Wol-
zenburg [2009] ECR I-9621 [116].
21See Nada v Switzerland Judgment of 12 September 2012 App No 10593/08 [168]; reiter-
ated in X v Latvia Judgment of 26 November 2013 App No 27853/09 [92].
22See infra C.2.






































decide whether or not to return the child under the Hague Child Abduction Con-
vention. In the former case, it is the analysis of the child’s best interests that would
have to be in compliance with the right to respect for “family life”, whereas in the
latter case it would be the analysis of the exceptions in Articles 12, 13 and 20 of the
Hague Convention which had to be in accordance with that right.23 Nevertheless,
the question as to how human rights have to be applied has to be distinguished
from the fact that they apply. Therefore, even when creating or implementing
international obligations of reciprocity and mutual recognition, states must not
derogate from their obligations under domestic and international human rights
law.24 Instead, apparently diverging commitments are to be harmonised as far
as possible, and public policy clauses provide a gateway to take on board
human rights concerns in private international law.25
Secondly, within the ambit of EU law, the EU’s commitment to the protection
of human rights enjoys primary law status (Article 6 TEU). Therefore, human
rights, such as the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter, rank higher than
the mutual recognition and reciprocity systems established by secondary legis-
lation in the Brussels and the Rome Regulations. This renders problematic the
“hyper-efficient” legislation which does not include public policy clauses,
because, according to the case-law of the Court of Justice, it does not allow the
requested Member State to take on board human rights concerns even in cases
of clear violations of the Charter.26 Instead, ensuring compliance with the appli-
cable human rights is entirely left in the hands of the requesting Member State.
With regard to the internal market, which is also based on a system of mutual rec-
ognition, the then-European Court of Justice (ECJ, now Court of Justice of the EU)
decided that human rights may even justify an interference with the primary law
provisions constituting the internal market: the free movement of goods, services,
persons, andcapital.The cases ofOmega andSchmidbergermay serve as examples.27
23PR Beaumont, “The Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the Euro-
pean Court of Justice on the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction” (2008)
335 Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law 9, 102; PR Beaumont,
K Trimmings, L Walker and J Holliday, supra n 14.
24Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v Ireland Judgment of 30 June
2005 App No 45036/98 [153]; Nada v Switzerland supra n 21 [170]; reiterated in X v Latvia
ibid [92].
25Compare Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v United Kingdom Judgment of 2 March 2010 App No
61498/08 [126]; Al-Adsani v United Kingdom Judgment of 21 November 2001 App No
35763/97 [55]; Nada v Switzerland supra n 21; X v Latvia ibid; German Federal Consti-
tutional Court, Case No 1 BvR 636/68 [1971] “Spaniard decision”.
26See Case C-491/10 supra n 14 [48–49]. This has already been criticized by LWalker and
P R Beaumont, “Shifting the Balance Achieved by the Abduction Convention: The Con-
trasting Approaches of the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of
Justice” (2011) Journal of Private International Law 231, 247–248.








































In this context, the Court emphasised that the public policy does not have to be
shared by all Member States, and one Member State can choose a system of pro-
tection different from that adopted by another state.28 Article 53 EUChFR con-
firms that the Charter shall not be interpreted as restricting or adversely
affecting human rights as recognised by international law and by the Member
States’ constitutions. Public policy clauses thus enable Member States to consider
human rights obligations going beyond those in the Charter, particularly domestic
constitutional rights.29
Thirdly, some national as well as European private international law codifica-
tions themselves re-emphasise that human rights have to be taken into account as
public policy considerations. Article 26 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/
2000 on insolvency proceedings30 provides that any Member State “may refuse
to recognise insolvency proceedings opened in another Member State or to
enforce a judgment handed down in the context of such proceedings where the
effects of such recognition or enforcement would be manifestly contrary to that
State’s public policy, in particular . . . the constitutional rights and liberties of the
individual” (emphasis added). Similarly, Section 328(4) of the German Civil Pro-
cedure Code reads: “Recognition of a judgment handed down by a foreign court
shall be ruled out if . . . the recognition of the judgment would lead to a result
that is obviously incompatible with essential principles of German law, and in par-
ticular if the recognition is not compatible with fundamental rights”.31 More
specifically, the US SPEECH Act 2010 refuses recognition of foreign defamation
judgments that are incompatible with the First Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States.32 Finally, it should be added that express protection of human
rights in public policy clauses are not singular to private international law codifica-
tions; they are also included in mutual recognition systems in EU criminal law.33
28Case C-124/97 Läärä [1999] ECR I-6067 [36]; Case C-67/98 Zenatti [1999] ECR I-7289
[34]; Case C-6/01 Anomar and others [2003] ECR I-8621 [80]; Case C-36/02 ibid [37–38].
29See, argumentum e contrario, Case C‐399/11 Melloni EU:C:2013:107 [61] on the
interpretation of Art 4a(1) of the Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June
2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member
States ([2002] OJ L190/1), which does not provide a public policy exception and thus
does not allow Member States to refuse to execute a European arrest warrant because of
domestically applicable fundamental rights.
30Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings,
[2000] OJ L160/1.
31Translation provided by Samson-Übersetzungen GmbH, Dr. Carmen von Schöning.
Emphasis added.
32“Securing the Protection of our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage Act”,
124 STAT. 2380 PUBLIC LAW 111–223 – AUG. 10, 2010, amending title 28, United
States Code (Judiciary and Judicial Procedure). See also Bachchan v India Abroad Publi-
cations, 154 Misc. 2d 228, 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992); Telnikoff v Matusevitch,
347 Md. 561, 702 A.2d 230 (Md. 1997), preceding the SPEECH Act.
33See Art 1(3) and Preamble 12 of the Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13
June 2002 on the European arrest warrant; Art 3(4) and Preamble 13 of the Council






































C. Standard of judicial scrutiny
1. Restrictive application of public policy clauses vs full consideration of
human rights
The fact that human rights are part of a state’s public policy has to be distinguished
from the standard of scrutiny a domestic court has to apply when assessing
whether the enforcement of a foreign judgment, or the application of foreign
law, would violate human rights. Especially where the receiving state and the
country of origin are member states to the same human rights convention, such
as the ECHR or the EUChFR, one might argue in favour of a reduced standard
of scrutiny, because the receiving state should be able to assume that the judg-
ments and the laws of the country of origin are in compliance with this conven-
tion.34 However, this would confuse the fact that the country of origin is bound
by human rights with whether this country actually complies with these human
rights standards. Otherwise, even those countries that have ratified the ICCPR
or even the ECHR but nonetheless exhibit a poor human rights record should
have to be relied on. Therefore, a more detailed analysis of this question is
called for.
It is widely agreed that public policy clauses may be relied on only restrictively
and under exceptional circumstances.35 Courts are prohibited from applying a
public policy clause solely on the ground that there is a discrepancy between
the applicable foreign law or the decision of the foreign court and the law of
the forum.36 A public policy clause must not be used for a revision of a foreign
decision on its merits (prohibition of a révision au fond) or as a lever to achieve
results that are compatible with domestic law in general. Public policy clauses
are therefore subject to a restrictive interpretation in various ways, depending
on the connection or proximity of the dispute with the forum, the intensity of
the link with the country of the forum, and the degree of relativity of the norms
Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the prin-
ciple of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences
or measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the
European Union, [2008] OJ L327/27.
34Maronier v Larmer [2002] EWCA Civ 774 [25] (Lord Phillips); Opinion of A-G Bot in
Case C-66/08 supra n 20 [98]. Compare A Mills, “The Dimensions of Public Policy in
Private International Law” (2008) Journal of Private International Law 201, 217.
35A Briggs, The Conflict of Laws (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, 2013) 151, 209; see
Case 145/86 Hoffmann v Krieg [1988] ECR 645 [21]; Case C-78/95 Hendrikman and
Feyen v Magenta Druck & Verlag [1996] ECR I-4943 [23]; Case C-7/98 supra n 3 [21];
Case C-341/04 Eurofood [2006] ECR I-3813 [62]; Case C‐420/07 Apostolides [2009]
ECR I-3571 [55]; Case C‐444/07 MG Probud Gdynia [2010] ECR I-417 [34]; Recital 22
of Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings,
[2000] OJ L160/1.
36Recitals 37 Rome I Regulation and 32 Rome II Regulation; Case 145/86 ibid [21]; Case
C-78/95 ibid [23]; Case C-38/98 supra n 17 [26]; Case C-7/98 supra n 3 [36]; G Van







































involved.37 Particularly restrictive interpretation of public policy clauses has been
called for with regard to the recognition of foreign judgments (effet atténué de
l’ordre public de la reconnaissance or, in the terminology of the German
Federal Court of Justice, ordre public international).38 In such cases, the matter
had already been settled. The parties to the original litigation have obtained a
legal position at the foreign court, the validity of which would be diminished
by the application of a public policy clause in the exequatur procedure.
Furthermore, particularly restrictive application of public policy clauses is
apparently required within the ambit of the internal market. In its 1999
Tampere meeting, the European Council hailed the principle of mutual recog-
nition as “the cornerstone of judicial co-operation in both civil and criminal
matters within the Union”.39 Mutual recognition in EU private international
law is closely related to economic integration and the internal market: Article
81(2) TFEU empowers the Council and the European Parliament to adopt
private international law rules “particularly when necessary for the proper func-
tioning of the internal market”. The predecessor to this provision, Article 65 EC,
even expressed unqualifiedly that measures in the field of judicial cooperation in
civil matters having cross-border implications may be adopted “insofar” as they
are “necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market”. As the Court of
Justice observed, the (now) EU rules on conflict of jurisdiction and on the rec-
ognition and enforcement of judgments were “without doubt intended to elimin-
ate obstacles to the functioning of the internal market which may derive from
disparities between national legislations on the subject”.40 Moreover, the link
between the internal market and the judicial cooperation in civil matters has
also been emphasised by two Advocates-General.41 One commentator even
speaks of the “free movement of judgments” as the “fifth freedom” of the internal
market.42
According to the Court of Justice, the public policy caveats in the Brussels I
Regulation and in the Rome Regulations have to be interpreted strictly inasmuch
as they constitute an obstacle to the attainment of the fundamental objectives of the
Regulations, which is to maintain and develop an area of freedom, security and
37For a detailed analysis, see A Mills, supra n 34, 201; A Mills, The Confluence of Public
and Private International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 191, 259; O Kahn-
Freund, supra n 16, 39.
38See German Federal Court of Justice, Case XI ZR 377–397 [1998].
39European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Tampere, 15 and 16 October 1999, para 33.
40Case C-281/02 Owusu v Jackson [2005] ECR I-1383 [34].
41See Opinion of A-G Kokott, Case C-420/07 supra n 35 [37]; Opinion of A-G Ruiz-Jarabo
Colomer, Case C‐14/08 Roda Golf & Beach Resort SL [2009] ECR I-5439 [71].
42JK Škerl, “European Public Policy (with an Emphasis on Exequatur Proceedings)” (2011)
Journal of Private International Law 461, 480. The idea of “free movement of judgments”
in the EU goes back to the Jenard Report on the 1968 Brussels Convention, see [1979] OJ
C59/7.






































justice for a proper functioning of the internal market.43 Recourse to a public
policy clause may be envisaged only where the adherence to the principle of
mutual recognition would constitute an obvious and manifest infringement of a
fundamental principle.44 As a consequence, the concept of public policy has to
be interpreted strictly and cannot be determined unilaterally by each Member
State without being subject to control by the EU institutions.45 Rather, the
Member States have to adopt all appropriate measures to guarantee the full
scope and effect of EU law so as to ensure its proper implementation.46
Yet, even where human rights were concerned, the Luxembourg Court held
that “recourse to the public-policy clause must be regarded as being possible in
exceptional cases where the guarantees laid down in the legislation of the state
of origin and in the Convention itself have been insufficient to protect the defen-
dant from a manifest breach” of his rights.47 Public policy “can be envisaged only
where recognition or enforcement of the judgment delivered in another [Member]
State would be at variance to an unacceptable degree with the legal order of the
State in which enforcement is sought inasmuch as it infringes a fundamental prin-
ciple. In order for the prohibition of any review of the foreign judgment as to its
substance to be observed, the infringement would have to constitute a manifest
breach of a rule of law regarded as essential in the legal order of the State in
which enforcement is sought or of a right recognised as being fundamental
within that legal order”.48 Accordingly, the concept of public policy presupposes,
in addition to the perturbation of the social order which any infringement of the
law involves, the existence of a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a funda-
mental interest of society.49
However, it is submitted that the unqualified obligation to protect human
rights does not allow such a restrictive interpretation of public policy where
human rights are concerned. Neither the expectations of the litigating parties
nor principles of comity, mutual recognition and reciprocity can be regarded
as inherent restrictions on human rights with the consequence that they
require a restrictive interpretation of public policy clauses. Rather, private inter-
national law has to operate within the framework of human rights, and not vice
43Case C-414/92 Solo Kleinmotoren [1994] ECR I-2237 [20], Case C-7/98 supra n 3 [21];
Case C-38/98 supra n 17 [26]. See Recitals 1 of the Rome Regulations and the Brussels I
Regulation 2001.
44Case C-7/98 supra n 3 [37]; Case C-38/98 supra n 17 [30]; Case C-341/04 supra n 35
[63]; Case C‐420/07 supra n 35 [59]; Case C‐394/07 Gambazzi [2009] ECR I-2563 [27];
A Briggs, supra n 7, 151, 209.
45See, eg, Case 41/74 Van Duyn v Home Office [1974] ECR 1337 [18]; Case 30/77 Boucher-
eau [1977] ECR 1999 [33]; Case C-54/99 Église de Scientologie [2000] ECR I-1335 [17].
46Case C-265/95 Commission v France [1997] ECR I-6959 [56].
47Case C-7/98 supra n 3 [44] (emphasis added).
48Case C-38/98 supra n 17 [30] (emphasis added).
49Case 30/77 supra n 45 [35]; Case C-54/99 supra n 45 [17]; Case C-36/02 supra n 27 [30];







































versa. Consequently, courts should apply full scrutiny regarding a violation of
human rights both when applying foreign law and when recognising foreign
judgments, in the ambit of both domestic and EU private international law
rules. In addition, any violation of domestically applicable human rights
should justify the application of public policy clauses, and neither only a “mani-
fest” infringement nor only violations of particular human rights, such as ius
cogens norms.
Three arguments support this tenet: a positivist, a structural, and a normative
argument. First, as has already been elaborated, domestic constitutions and inter-
national conventions stipulate that human rights are binding on all branches of the
state, including the judiciary, and including all areas of law.50 Human rights codi-
fications do not distinguish between the nature of the legal question to be resolved,
but claim prevalence in all circumstances. Consequently, they also require full
consideration in the application of private international law regarding the
human rights compatibility of both the applicable legislation and the decisions
of the courts applying that legislation, in so far as the legislation allows courts
to take on board human rights concerns.
Secondly, human rights set objectives for states which go beyond bi- or multi-
lateral exchange of rights and obligations. Human rights are not rules which are
either fulfilled or not, but principles which have to be observed and optimised.51
They have to be given optimal effect when the law is being applied, including
private international law. And the main instruments to give effect to human
rights in private international law are the public policy clauses. Introducing
human rights into private international law via public policy clauses thus requires
balancing the legitimate expectations of the parties as well as the principles of
comity, mutual recognition and reciprocity against the need to protect human
rights. Hence, the claim that human rights have to make way for litigants’ expec-
tations or international obligations misconceives their structure as optimisation
requirements.
Thirdly, human rights are subjective, individual rights, not state interests.
Human rights protection is therefore not at states’ disposal. Consequently, the
observance of human rights is mandatory, not discretionary. States cannot
exempt themselves from human rights protection, not even by joining systems
of mutual recognition.52 The argument that member states of a system of
mutual recognition must have trust in each other’s legal system would render
50See Art 2 ICCPR, Art 1 ECHR, Art 6 HRA 1998, or Art 1(3) German Basic Law.
51R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 1977 (republished Duckworth, 1996) 22 et seq; R
Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford University Press, 2002) 48 et seq.
52See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1951, 19 (28 May 1951); EComHR, Austria/
Pfunders v Italy Decision of 11 January 1961 App No 788/60, 18; IACtHR, The Effect
of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on Human Rights
(Arts 74 and 75), Advisory Opinion OC-2/82, 24 September 1982 [29].






































effective human rights protection illusory.53 On the contrary, private international
law has to be conceptualised as a system of rights protection itself.54 Private inter-
national law should be perceived not only as a tool to operate systems of mutual
recognition and reciprocity or to ensure the smooth functioning of the internal
market, but also an instrument to safeguard individual rights. Hence, the appli-
cation of public policy clauses to protect human rights ensures that the system
of private international law contributes to the broader European and international
endeavour to establish and to protect human rights.55
Therefore, under private international law, domestic courts must fully consider
domestically applicable human rights when applying foreign law, or when recog-
nising and enforcing a foreign judgment. Section 328(4) of the German Civil Pro-
cedure Code, which has already been cited above, can serve as a role model for
domestic and European legislators when drafting public policy clauses. The pro-
vision stipulates that recognition of a judgment handed down by a foreign court
shall be ruled out if the recognition of the judgment would lead to a result that
is obviously incompatible with essential principles of German law. This corre-
sponds to the doctrine that not any incompatibility with domestic law should
open the floodgates of public policy, but only a manifest (or obvious) incompat-
ibility. But the provision further states that recognition of a judgment handed
down by a foreign court shall be ruled out “in particular if the recognition is not
compatible with fundamental rights”. Consequently, the provision places incom-
patibility with fundamental rights on equal footing with an obvious incompatibility
with essential principles of German law. By doing so, the provision successfully
reconciles the requirement of a generally restrictive application of public policy
clauses with the obligation to take full account of human rights.56
2. Indirect horizontal effect and the principle of proportionality as
correctives
As has just been indicated, public policy clauses bear the odium of opening the
“floodgates” for the application of domestic law, thus disappointing expectations
of the parties involved, disrupting the harmony of mutual recognition and recipro-
city in the international community and, within the EU, endangering the smooth
functioning of the internal market. Yet it has also been shown that where
human rights are concerned, these restrictions should not apply in a way that
only violations of ius cogens norms or only “manifest” or “obvious” human
53See S Peers, supra n 9, 109.
54See A Mills, supra n 34, 187–198, 264–286.
55Compare A Mills ibid, 286; J K Škerl, supra n 42, 490; B Juratowitch, “The European
Convention on Human Rights and English Private International Law” (2007) Journal of
Private International Law 173, 197.
56Compare German Federal Constitutional Court, Case No 1 BvR 636/68 [1971] “Spaniard







































rights violations justify the application of public policy clauses. As the obligation
to protect human rights is universal, unconditional, indivisible, and cannot be
derogated from by virtue of obligations of mutual recognition and reciprocity, a
restrictive interpretation of human rights as public policy is not defensible. As a
consequence, courts should neither apply foreign law nor recognise a foreign judg-
ment if doing so would constitute or perpetuate a human rights violation. The
“manifest infringement” standard for the interpretation of public policy clauses
should only apply to public policy considerations that are not based on human
rights.
However, this should not give cause for the concern that human rights public
policy opens the “floodgates” for the imposition of national concepts on foreign
law or foreign judgments. There is no need to reduce the impact of human
rights on private international law by recourse to extrinsic concepts, such as
effet atténué. Rather, the impact of human rights on private international law is
already limited by factors which are inherent in human rights doctrine: the prin-
ciple of proportionality and the mere indirect horizontal effect of human rights
in private law relationships. The principle of proportionality, or more precisely,
the proportionality sensu stricto analysis, requires that a court, when applying
foreign law, has to duly take the applicable human rights that are binding on
this court into consideration. Similarly, in exequatur proceedings, a court of the
enforcing country has to review whether the outcome of the foreign judgment is
compatible with the human rights applicable in the country where enforcement
is sought. And in this context, it has to be considered that human rights principally
do not have a direct effect between individuals; they are not actionable per se
between private parties. Human rights are not rules stipulating conditions for
actionable claims, such as the right to damages or injunctions.57 Yet they influence
the interpretation and application of pre-existing law in a trial between private
individuals because the courts as adjudicators are obliged to protect individuals
from fellow citizens within the private law order.58 Accordingly, the balancing
57There is one exception to this principle, and this applies if a human rights catalogue itself
provides that certain rights apply between private individuals. This is the case, for example,
with regard to Art 14 of the American Convention of Human Rights, which provides a right
to reply to “[a]nyone injured by inaccurate or offensive statements or ideas disseminated to
the public in general by a legally regulated medium of communication”. This provisions is,
therefore, a human right directly applicable between private individuals.
58See, eg, A Drzemczewski, “The European Human Rights Convention and Relations
between Private Parties” (1979) Netherlands International Law Review 168; S Alkema,
“The Third-Party Applicability or ‘Drittwirkung’ in the European Convention on Human
Rights” in F Matscher and H Petzold (eds), Protecting Human Rights: The European Dimen-
sion in Honour of GJ Wiarda (Heymanns,1988) 35; A Clapham,Human Rights in the Private
Sphere (Oxford University Press, 1993); A Barak, “Constitutional Human Rights and Private
Law” in D Friedmann and D Barak-Erez (eds),Human Rights in Private Law (Hart, 2001) 13;
S Kay, “The European Convention on Human Rights and the Control of Private Law” (2005)
European Human Rights Law Review 466, 475 et seq; H Fenwick and G Phillipson, Media






































of conflicting rights has to take place within the application of private law rules,
and not independently thereof. Where human rights interests are in conflict, dom-
estic courts have to apply private law, but taking into account applicable human
rights, in a balancing exercise. If courts do not balance the conflicting rights prop-
erly, they violate a party’s human rights. International examples for this balancing
exercise are provided in the notorious von Hannover decisions,59 Mosley v United
Kingdom,60 Eweida and others v United Kingdom61 and many more decisions
from the Strasbourg Court,62 as well as in Fontevecchia and D’Amico v Argen-
tina63 from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
By contrast, when considering procedural public policy, courts have to
examine alleged violations of human rights not in their indirect horizontal
effect, but in their direct vertical effect. Procedural public policy clauses apply
to procedural mistakes made by the foreign court in the adjudicative procedure,
and not with regard to the decision of the private law dispute on the merits. As
a result, when scrutinising procedural public policy, courts have to balance the
gravity of the violation of the procedural right with the legitimate expectations
of the party seeking enforcement.
D. Review by the Strasbourg Court
Since public policy also involves human rights concerns, the wrongful application
or non-application of public policy clauses by a court of a Convention state may
itself constitute a human rights violation, either because the court refuses to invoke
public policy although the foreign judgment or the application of foreign law vio-
lates human rights, or because the court applies a public policy clause although the
foreign judgment – or, more generally, the status acquired abroad64 – or the
Freedom under the Human Rights Act (Oxford University Press, 2006) 128; M Nowak,
CCPR (2nd ed, NP Engel, 2005) Introduction, para 4.
59von Hannover v Germany (No 1) Judgment of 24 June 2004 App No 59320/00, von
Hannover v Germany (No 2) Judgment of 7 February 2012 App Nos 40660/08 and
60641/08 and von Hannover v Germany (No 3) Judgment of 19 September 2013
App No 8772/10 [62].
60Mosley v United Kingdom Judgment of 11 May 2011 App No 48009/08 [129].
61Eweida and others v United Kingdom Judgment of 15 January 2013 App Nos 48420/10,
59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10 [89–95] and [107–110].
62See, eg, Lingens v Austria Judgment of 8 July 1986 App No 9815/82; Bladet Tromsø and
Stensaas v Norway 20 May 1999 App No 21980/93; Bergens Tidende and others v Norway
Judgment of 2 May 2000 App No 26132/95; Jerusalem v Austria Judgment of 27 February
2001 App No 26958/95; Egeland and Hanseid v Norway Judgment of 16 April 2009
App No 34438/04; MGN Ltd v United Kingdom Judgment of 18 January 2011 App No
39401/04; Novaya Gazeta and Borodyanskiy v Russia Judgment of 28 March 2013
App No 14087/08.
63Fontevecchia and D’Amico v Argentina [2011] Case 12.524.
64See P Kinsch, “Recognition in the Forum of a Status Acquired Abroad – Private Inter-







































outcome of the application of the foreign law is human rights-compatible. For
example, if a court recognises a foreign defamation judgment or applies foreign
defamation laws, it might be in violation of the defendant’s freedom of expression
by refusing to consider public policy. In turn, if a court refuses to recognise a
foreign defamation judgment or to apply foreign defamation law because of
freedom of expression as public policy, it might violate the claimant’s right to
respect for private life.65 In addition, the refusal to recognise and enforce a judg-
ment constitutes, according to the Strasbourg Court, an interference with Article 6
ECHR.66
When analysing the scope of the ECtHR’s judicial review, two questions have
to be distinguished. First, as the EU itself is not a Contracting Party to the ECHR, it
is questionable whether the Strasbourg Court may review the (non-)application of
public policy clauses codified in EU legislation by courts of EU Member States. It
will be argued in the next section that the restrictive Bosphorus doctrine should not
be applied. Secondly, it will be shown that the Strasbourg Court’s scrutiny is only
reduced where the refusal to apply public policy clauses against judgments orig-
inating from other Convention states is concerned. In all the other cases, the
ECtHR should apply strict scrutiny.
1. (Non-)application of public policy clauses in EU legislation
Following Articles 1 and 34 ECHR, the alleged violation of human rights through
the application of public policy clauses – or the refusal thereof – by a domestic
court of a Convention state can be the subject of an application to the ECtHR.
This is unproblematic where the (non-)application of domestic public policy
clauses is concerned.67 Such domestic public policy clauses remain applicable if
recognition of a judgment obtained in a non-EU Member State is sought, or if
Convergence and Divergence in Private International Law – Liber Amicorum Kurt Siehr
(Eleven International Publishing, 2010) 259, 266; P Kinsch, “Private International Law
Topics before the European Court of Human Rights” (2011) Yearbook of Private Inter-
national Law 37, 42–45.
65CompareWagner, supra n 4, finding a violation of Art 8 ECHR because the receiving state
refused to recognise a judicial decision concerning full adoption of a child by a single
woman, and Leschiutta and Fraccaro v Belgium Judgment of 17 July 2008 App Nos
58081/00, 58411/00 finding a violation of Art 8 ECHR because the receiving state did
not immediately enforce a foreign judgment on handing over custody of a child.
66Hornsby v Greece Judgment of 19 March 1997 App No 18357/91 (regarding the lack of
enforcement of a domestic judgment); McDonald v France Judgment of 29 April 2008
App No 18648/04 (non-recognition of a divorce decree obtained abroad); Negrepontis-
Giannisis v Greece Judgment of 3 May 2011 App No 56759/08 (non-recognition of a
foreign adoption judgment); for comment on enforcement as a procedural right see P
Kinsch, “Private International Law Topics before the European Court of Human Rights”
(2011) Yearbook of Private International Law 37, 44, n 21.
67Compare Bosphorus supra n 24 [157].






































EU legislation on the choice of law does not cover or expressly excludes a certain
matter from the scope of its application, as is the case with, for example, Article 1
(2) Rome II Regulation. It is questionable, however, if and to what extent the Stras-
bourg Court may review the (non-)application of public policy clauses enshrined
in EU private international law by EU Member States’ courts. An accession of the
EU to the ECHR would have significantly reduced the practical importance of this
question, since acts of the EU and of the Member States would then have been
equally subject to the ECtHR’s scrutiny. But with its Opinion 2/13, the CJEU
has rendered accession difficult, if not impossible.68
In Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v Ireland, the
Strasbourg Court held that state action taken in compliance with legal obligations
flowing from the state’s membership in an international organisation “is justified
as long as the relevant organisation is considered to protect fundamental rights, as
regards both the substantive guarantees offered and the mechanisms controlling
their observance, in a manner which can be considered at least equivalent to
that for which the Convention provides”.69 If such “equivalent protection” – a
term which the Court further defines in its judgment – is provided by the organ-
isation, “the presumption will be that a State has not departed from the require-
ments of the Convention when it does no more than implement legal
obligations flowing from its membership of the organisation”.70 As the Court con-
siders the protection of fundamental rights by EU law “in principle equivalent” to
that of the Convention system, there is a presumption that Member States do not
depart from the requirements of the ECHR when they implement legal obligations
flowing from their membership of the European Union.71 This presumption can be
rebutted, however, if the protection of Convention rights in a particular case was
“manifestly deficient”.72 This is the case, for example, if the domestic court refuses
to request a preliminary ruling from the CJEU on an alleged violation of a party’s
fundamental rights.73
The decisive question is, therefore, whether the (non-)application of public
policy clauses codified in EU private international law is “flowing” from the
Member States’ legal obligations under EU private international law or whether
such acts fall outside their strict legal obligations. The Strasbourg Court empha-
sised that in the latter case Convention States remain fully responsible under the
Convention, and the ECHR’s role as a “constitutional instrument of European
public order” in the field of human rights would outweigh the interest of
68Opinion 2/13 supra n 10.
69Bosphorus supra n 24 [155]; reiterated in, for example,Michaud v France Judgment of 6
December 2012 App No 12323/11 [103].
70Bosphorus supra n 24 [156].
71See Bosphorus ibid [165]; Povse supra n 14 [77].
72Bosphorus supra n 24 [156].







































international cooperation.74 This is particularly the case if the Member States exer-
cise discretion when applying EU law.
This question has not been answered yet with regard to public policy clauses
under EU private international law. The post-Bosphorus cases decided by the
Strasbourg Court, namely Povse v Austria and Avotiņš v Latvia, related to EU
private international law rules which, according to the Strasbourg Court, did not
leave the Member States any discretion as to their application.75 Povse v
Austria concerned Articles 42 and 11(8) of the Brussels IIa Regulation, in
which exequatur has been abolished. The applicant in Avotiņš v Latvia complained
about the refusal of the enforcing Latvian authorities to invoke Article 34(2) of the
Brussels I Regulation, to which Article 45(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation now
corresponds. Accordingly, a judgment given in default of appearance shall not
be recognised “if the defendant was not served with the document which instituted
the proceedings . . . in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange
for his defence, unless [he] failed to commence proceedings to challenge the judg-
ment when it was possible for him to do so”. The majority of the Court’s Fourth
Section briefly indicated that the Latvian court was “under a duty to ensure the rec-
ognition” of the foreign (Cypriot) judgment in Latvia.76 The majority thus denied
any discretion on the domestic court’s behalf, which would have brought the case
outside the scope of the Bosphorus doctrine, and eventually found no violation of
Article 6 ECHR. Three out of seven judges dissented, highlighting – among other
aspects – that because of its Article 34(2) the Brussels I Regulation “does not
provide for blind automaticity as concerns the execution of judgments”.77 In
fact, Article 34(2) requires the interpretation and application of ambiguous
terms, such as the service of the defendant with a document “in sufficient time”
and the defendant’s failure to commence proceedings “when it was possible for
him to do”.78 This suggests that the Latvian court might indeed have had
certain discretion when recognising the Cypriot judgment. The decision has
been referred to the Grand Chamber and is still pending.
Yet those decisions have to be distinguished from possible cases involving
public policy. It is argued here that EU public policy clauses do leave discretion
to the Member States and hence their (non-)application do not fall under the
74Bosphorus supra n 24 [156–157]; M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece Judgment of 21 January
2011 App No 30696/09 [338]; Michaud supra n 69 [103] and [113].
75Povse supra n 14 [79]; Avotiņš v Latvia Judgment of 25 February 2014 App No 17502/07
[47–49].
76Avotiņš ibid [49].
77Avotiņš supra n 75, Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Ziemele, Bianku and De Gaetano
[4]. The decision also met with criticism in the academic literature; see, eg, G Cuniberti,
supra n 13, para 59; M Requejo Isidro, „Exequaturverfahren und EMRK: Die EuGVVO
vor dem EGMR” (2015) IPRax 69.
78On the interpretation of those terms, see Case C-283/05 ASML Netherlands BV v Semi-
conductor Industry Services GmbH (SEMIS) [2006] ECR I-12041; Case C‐420/07 supra
n 35 [72–80].






































Bosphorus doctrine.79 This argument finds support in the decision M.S.
S. v. Belgium and Greece. In this case, Belgium had discretion to decide
whether or not to make use of the “sovereignty clause” in Article 3(2) of the
then-Dublin II Regulation. In derogation from Article 3(1) of that Regulation,
Article 3(2) would have given the Belgian officials the authority to examine an
asylum application themselves rather than transferring the applicant back to
Greece. Therefore, the order of the Belgian authorities in compliance with
Article 3(1) directing the applicant to apply for asylum in Greece, where he met
with appalling conditions of detention and reception of asylum-seekers, was
subject to the Court’s full scrutiny. The Court held: “In such a case, the State con-
cerned becomes the member State responsible for the purposes of the Regulation
and takes on the obligations associated with that responsibility . . . [T]he Belgian
authorities could have refrained from transferring the applicant if they had con-
sidered that the receiving country, namely Greece, was not fulfilling its obligations
under the Convention. Consequently, the Court considers that the impugned
measure taken by the Belgian authorities did not strictly fall within Belgium’s
international legal obligations. Accordingly, the presumption of equivalent protec-
tion [as established in Bosphorus] does not apply in this case”.80 It is to be
expected that the Court would apply the same reasoning to the (non-)application
of public policy clauses in EU private international law. From a human rights per-
spective, such a development could only be welcomed.
At the same time, the Court of Justice of the EU may also review the compli-
ance of such acts with the Charter, as Member States applying public policy
clauses under EU private international law are to be regarded as “implementing
Union law” within the meaning of Article 51(1) EUChFR. At first glance, this
appears to be paradoxical, since Member States applying public policy clauses
are not “implementing” EU law, but rather derogate from mutual recognition
and reciprocity obligations established by EU law. However, it follows from the
Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights as well as from the
case-law of the Court of Justice that it is sufficient for the application of the
Charter if the Member States “act in the scope” of EU law.81 Hence, the fact
that Member States may have discretion to apply public policy clauses does not
affect the applicability of the Charter.82 Consequently, the (non-)application by
the Member States of public policy clauses codified in EU private international
79See also G Cuniberti, supra n 13, 103 paras 54 and 58.
80M.S.S. supra n 74 [339–340]; reiterated in Tarakhel v Switzerland Judgment of 4 Novem-
ber 2014 App No 29217/12 [89–90].
81Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, [2007] OJ C303/17 (on the
interpretative force of the Explanations, see Art 52(7) EUChFR); ECJ, Case C-260/89 ERT
[1991] ECR I-2925 [42]; Case C-309/96 Annibaldi [1997] ECR I-7493 [13]; Case C-617/10
Åkerberg Fransson EU:C:2013:105 [19].
82Joined Cases C‐411/10 and C‐493/10 N.S. and others [2011] ECR I-13905 [68]; compare







































law may lead to a judicial review by both the Strasbourg Court and the Luxem-
bourg Court.83
2. Standard of scrutiny of the ECtHR’s review
The question remains which standard of scrutiny the Strasbourg Court should
apply to claims of human rights violations by the (non-)application of public
policy clauses. The Court’s decisions concerning alleged human rights violations
in international systems of comity, reciprocity and mutual recognition have
revealed a reduced standard of scrutiny. The origins of the Strasbourg Court’s
case-law in this regard can be traced back to the 1989 decision Soering v
United Kingdom, in which the Court established that extradition of a German
national to the United States to face charges of capital murder violated Article 3
ECHR, as the applicant would be exposed to the so-called “death row phenom-
enon”.84 However, the Court also established in this decision that in cases in
which the extraditing Convention state had to consider whether the applicant’s
right to a fair trial would be observed in the requesting non-Convention state,
the Strasbourg Court reduces its own scope of judicial review to a “flagrant
denial of justice” standard. According to the Court, Article 1 ECHR does not
require a Convention state not to surrender an individual unless satisfied that
the conditions awaiting him in the country of destination are fully compliant
with the Convention, as this would indirectly place the requesting non-Convention
state under the obligations of the Convention.85
InDrozd and Janousek v France and Spain and in Iribarne Pérez v France, the
Strasbourg Court applied the reduced “flagrant denial of justice” standard of scru-
tiny to the enforcement of foreign criminal convictions in Convention states.86 Both
cases concerned the enforcement of criminal sentences in France and Spain that had
been passed in the criminal courts of Andorra, which had not yet become a member
of the Council of Europe. Although the sentences had been adopted by questionable
procedures,87 the Court did not find a violation of the Convention in either case.
Then, in Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v Germany, the Court applied a
83Compare M.S.S. supra n 74, on the one hand, and N.S. and others, ibid, on the other,
regarding the Common European Asylum System.
84Soering v United Kingdom Judgment of 7 July 1989 App No 14038/88. This phenomenon
consists in a combination of circumstances to which someone sentenced to death would be
exposed (para 81). The human rights violation would not have consisted of the application
of the death penalty itself, as the death penalty had not yet been abolished by the
Convention.
85See Soering ibid [113]; see also Mamatkulov and Askarov v Turkey Judgment of 4 Feb-
ruary 2005 App Nos 46827/99 and 46951/99 [88] and the Joint Partly Dissenting Opinion
of Judges Bratza, Bonell and Hedigan [14].
86Drozd and Janousek v France and Spain Judgment of 26 June 1992 App No 12747/87
[110]; Iribarne Pérez v France Judgment of 24 October 1995 App No 16462/90 [31].
87Compare S Peers, supra n 9, 677.






































similarly restrictive standard of scrutiny regarding the review of administrative
court proceedings.88 In 1946, the former Czechoslovakia confiscated an old paint-
ing of the applicant’s late father based on the “BenešDecrees”. Five years later, the
Bratislava Administrative Court dismissed the appeal lodged by the applicant’s
father. In 1991, the applicant sought the return of the painting which was on loan
to a German municipality. Citing Drozd, the Strasbourg Court observed,
however, “that the German courts were not required to assess whether the standard
of the BratislavaAdministrative Court proceedings . . . was adequate, in particular if
seen against the procedural safeguards of the Convention.”89
Yet it has for a long time been uncertain whether the reduced standard of review
had to be applied to the enforcement of civil law judgments, too. The decision Pel-
legrini v Italy, adopted eight days after Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v
Germany, seemed to indicate the contrary.90 In this case concerning the annulment
of a marriage under Canon Law, the applicant had been summoned to appear before
an ecclesiastical court, whichwas outside the ambit of the ECHR. The applicant had
not been informed about her right to seek legal assistance, she did not have access to
the court files or to witness statements, and she did not receive a full copy of the
decision. The Strasbourg Court decided that the enforcement of this judgment in
Italy violated Article 6(1) of the Convention. However, the Court did not refer to
the concept of “flagrant denial”, which seemed to indicate that this restricted stan-
dard of scrutiny does not apply to civil law cases. Yet, inGovernment of the United
States of America v Barnette, the House of Lords distinguished Pellegrini from
Drozd and Janousek on the basis that Pellegrini turned on a special legal relation-
ship between the Italian civil courts and the ecclesiastical court that was governed
by the terms of a Concordat.91 Alternatively, one could also argue that the Stras-
bourg Court actually regarded the violation of the applicant’s Article 6 ECHR
rights as a “flagrant denial of justice”, without expressly mentioning it.
The ECtHR did not clarify this point in its 2004 decision Lindberg v Sweden,
where the Court did “not deem it necessary for the purposes of its examination . . .
to determine the general issue concerning what standard should apply where the
enforcing state as well as the state whose court gave the contested decision is a
Contracting Party to the Convention”.92 Furthermore, the judges declined any
comment on what standard of scrutiny should apply where the subject-matter is
88Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v Germany Judgment of 12 July 2001 App No
42527/98.
89Ibid [64].
90Pellegrini supra n 3 [46].
91Government of the United States of America supra n 3 [21] (per Lord Carswell). Accord-
ing to Art 8(2) of this Concordat, Italian courts have to verify that in the proceedings before
the ecclesiastical courts the right to sue and defend in court has been assured to the parties in
a way not dissimilar from what is required by the fundamental principles of the Italian legal
system.







































one of substantive rather than procedural public policy. In this case, the applicant,
a seal hunting inspector, had been ordered to pay compensation for the publication
of allegations to the effect that certain seal hunters had violated Norwegian seal
hunting regulations. Mr Lindberg’s application to the former European Commis-
sion of Human Rights against the Norwegian court’s judgment alleging violations
of Articles 6, 10 and 13 of the Convention had been declared inadmissible as
having been lodged out of time.93 Therefore, the applicant lodged an application
against the decision of the Swedish authorities not to refuse the enforcement of the
defamation judgment in Sweden, where he lived. The ECtHR held that the
Swedish courts reviewed the substance of the applicant’s complaint against the
requested enforcement of the Norwegian judgment “to a sufficient degree”, and
that the application disclosed “no appearance of violation of Article 10 of the Con-
vention”.94 Most notably, in the related case of Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v
Norway, the Strasbourg Court decided that a defamation judgment against a news-
paper that published statements from the applicant’s report violated the newspa-
per’s right under Article 10 ECHR.95 The diverging judgments are partly due to
the fact that the Court held the newspaper to be entitled to rely on an official
report. However, the rejection of the second Lindberg application is obviously
also due to the Strasbourg Court’s reduced scope of judicial review. Given the
Bladet Tromsø decision, Mr Lindberg’s application against the Norwegian
decision, had it been lodged on time, would have had a higher chance of success.
Yet the Strasbourg Court finally confirmed the “flagrant denial of justice” stan-
dard of scrutiny regarding the enforcement of civil law judgments in the child
custody-related case Eskinazi and Chelouche v Turkey, where it held that the Con-
vention “does not require the Contracting Parties to impose its standards on third
States or territories”.96 To require Contracting Parties (in this case, Turkey) to
review under the Convention all aspects of proceedings of non-contracting
parties (in this case, Israel) “would thwart the current trend towards strengthening
international cooperation in the administration of justice, a trend which is in prin-
ciple in the interests of the persons concerned, and would risk turning international
instruments into a dead letter, to the detriment of the persons they protect”.97
To summarise, the Strasbourg Court does not see itself entitled to review
foreign criminal, administrative or civil proceedings concerning any denial of
justice, but reduces its standard of scrutiny to a “flagrant” denial.98 This means
93EComHR, Lindberg v Norway Decision of 26 February 1997 App No 26604/95. In Lind-
berg v Sweden, the application number is mistakenly referred to as 26604/94.
94Lindberg, supra n 92.
95Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas, supra n 62.
96Eskinazi and Chelouche v Turkey Decision of 6 December 2005 App No 14600/05, p. 26
of the English translation.
97Ibid (references omitted).
98See Soering supra n 84 [113]; Einhorn v France Decision of 16 October 2001 App No
71555/01 [32]; Mamatkulov and Askarov v Turkey Judgment of 4 February 2005 App






































that the domestic authorities must have found “substantial grounds for believing”
that the foreign trial took place in conditions that contravened the right to a fair
trial, without going into the details of a broad debate on the specific features of
the foreign judicial system.99 It is therefore not sufficient that there is information
available that may give cause for doubting that the applicants would receive a fair
trial under the foreign judicial system; rather, there has to be sufficient evidence
available to show that any possible irregularities in the trial were liable to consti-
tute a “flagrant” denial of justice.100 This requires an unfairness going beyond
mere irregularities or lack of safeguards in trial procedures, namely a breach of
the principles of fair trial guaranteed which is so fundamental that it destroys
the very essence of the right to a fair trial.101
However, the Strasbourg Court’s reduced standard of scrutiny in exequatur
cases cannot be welcomed. As has been shown, the “flagrant denial of justice”
standard of scrutiny, which is in itself a rather amorphous concept,102 has been
developed in a removal case, where the extraditing state had to consider
whether the applicant’s right to a fair trial would be observed in the requesting
state.103 However, cases of enforcement of foreign judgments are structurally
different, and the same applies to the application of foreign law by a Convention
state court. With the enforcement of a foreign judgment in a Convention state or
the application of foreign law by a court of a Convention state in violation of
human rights, the Convention state itself would directly commit the human
rights violation within the ambit of the Convention. This is exactly contrary to
the obligation referred to in Article 1 ECHR, according to which the Contracting
Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms
defined in the Convention. It is therefore not acceptable that the Convention
state is subject to a reduced standard of review by the ECtHR, only because the
original judgment originated from another country, or because the court had
applied foreign law.
Therefore, it is submitted that the following principles regarding the ECtHR’s
standard of scrutiny concerning the (non-)application of public policy clauses
should apply. The Strasbourg Court should apply a reduced standard of scrutiny
regarding the non-application of enforcement public policy clauses against judg-
ments originating from another Convention state (first principle). However, in all
the other cases, the ECtHR should apply strict scrutiny: the application of
Nos 46827/99 and 46951/99 [88]; Maumousseau and Washington v France Judgment of 6
December 2007 App No 39388/05 [99]. See also Case C-341/04 supra n 35 [67].
99Einhorn ibid [34]; Eskinazi supra n 96, p. 27 of the English translation.
100Mamatkulov supra n 98 [91].
101See Joint Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judges Bratza, Bonell and Hedigan to Mamatku-
lov supra n 98 [14].
102See B Juratowitch, supra n 55, 180.
103See Soering supra n 84 [113]; Bader v Sweden Judgment of 8 November 2005 App No







































enforcement public policy clauses against judgments originating from another
Convention state (second principle), both the application and non-application of
enforcement public policy clauses against judgments originating from a third
country (third principle), and both the application and non-application of choice
of law public policy clauses (fourth principle).
Concerning the first principle, that is, the reduced standard of scrutiny with
regard to the refusal to apply public policy clauses against the recognition of judg-
ments originating from another Convention state, Lindberg v Sweden reveals the
conundrum that occurs when the judgment to be enforced had been decided in
another Convention state (in this case, in Norway). The applicant had failed to
raise a complaint against the Norwegian court’s judgment in Strasbourg within
the time limit. The decision of the Swedish court not to refuse the enforcement
of the defamation judgment in Sweden thus seemed to have provided the applicant
with a second chance to appeal to Strasbourg Court. However, the mere coinci-
dence that the applicant lived in Sweden, and not in Norway, should not open a
back door for the applicant to de facto have his inadmissible application against
the Norwegian judgment reviewed. It is not the function of public policy
clauses to circumvent the admissibility rules of the Strasbourg Court’s procedure.
The proper venue of redress for the defendant would have been judicial review of
an alleged human rights violation in the original proceedings, here against the Nor-
wegian judgments.104 However, a complaint in Strasbourg against the non-appli-
cation of public policy in the enforcing country would have given the applicant the
undue possibility of being able to reopen matters that were already settled. A full
scrutiny of the non-application of an enforcement-preventing public policy clause
by the Strasbourg Court would run the risk of “upsetting the coherence of the div-
ision of roles between national review bodies and the European Court, making up
the system of collective enforcement under the Convention”.105 As a consequence,
in cases where both the enforcing state and the state whose court gave the con-
tested decision are parties to the Convention, the Strasbourg Court should
reduce its standard of scrutiny to flagrant violations of human rights.
However, this reduced standard of scrutiny should not apply to all other cases
of (non-) application of public policy clauses (second to fourth principle). Here,
the Strasbourg Court should fully consider human rights in their vertical effect
where breaches of Article 6 ECHR are concerned (procedural public policy),
and in their indirect horizontal effect where breaches of human rights by the appli-
cation of private law are concerned (substantive public policy). The argument that
redress to the Strasbourg Court should be sought against an original judgment does
not apply in such cases. Rather, it would be the court of the Convention state that
104See, by comparison, the child abduction case of Povse supra n 14 [86]: “it is open to the
applicants to rely on their Convention rights before the [requesting] Italian courts”, instead
of the enforcing Austrian courts.
105Lindberg supra n 92, 10.






































would be the first one in violation of Convention rights: by refusing recognition of
a judgment from another Convention state, by recognising and enforcing (or not
recognising) a third-country judgment, or by applying (or not applying) foreign
law, in violation of the ECHR. In these situations, the applicant has never had
the opportunity to seek redress in Strasbourg: not in the constellation of the
second principle, because the applicant had been successful in the original litiga-
tion; not in the constellation of the third principle, because the country of the court
of origin is not a Convention state; and not in the constellation of the fourth prin-
ciple, because it is the court of the Convention state that conducts the proceedings
and issues the judgment.
Yet one additional thought has to be given to the constellation of the fourth
principle. One might argue that the ECHR is applied beyond its territorial scope
if a court of a Convention state refuses to apply the law of a non-Convention
state because the outcome of such an application is allegedly incompatible with
the ECHR. However, as has been elaborated earlier, when applying its private
international law and deciding a case based on foreign law, the forum judge is
still bound by the Convention because of Article 1 ECHR. Consequently, even
if the applicable law is that of a non-Convention state, the consideration of the
Convention rights via the public policy clause is not an extra-territorial application
of the ECHR, but an application of a domestically applicable public policy clause
in the light of the ECHR.106 Moreover, the Strasbourg Court’s task is not to review
the relevant legislation – neither the foreign law nor the domestic private inter-
national law requiring the application of the foreign law – in the abstract;
rather, it must “as far as possible confine itself” to the issues raised by the concrete
case before it.107 And the applicant’s rights would in concreto be breached by the
domestic court, albeit under application of foreign law.108
106See M Stürner, “Extraterritorial application of the ECHR via private international law? A
comment from a German perspective” (2011) Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht 8,
11. On the unlawfulness of an extra-territorial application of the Convention, see Banković
and others v Belgium and others Decision of 12 December 2001 App No 52207/99; Ben El
Mahi and others v Denmark Decision of 11 December 2006 App No 5853/06. Only in
“exceptional circumstances” may acts of Convention States performed outside their terri-
tory amount to exercise by them of their jurisdiction within the meaning of Art 1 ECHR,
see Issa and others v Turkey Judgment of 16 November 2004 App No 31821/96 [68].
107Compare, among many other authorities, The Holy Monasteries v Greece Judgment of 9
December 1994 App No 13092/87, 13984/88 [55]. An example for a decision on an alleged
human rights violation committed through the application of foreign law is EComHR, X. v
Belgium and the Netherlands Decision of 10 July 1975 App No 6482/74.
108See P Kinsch, “The Impact of Human Rights on the Application of Foreign Law and the
Recognition of Foreign Judgments – A Survey of the Cases Decided by the European
Human Rights Institutions”, T Einhorn and K Siehr (eds), Intercontinental Cooperation
Through Private International Law – Essays in Memory of Peter E Nygh (TMC Asser








































Globalisation has led, and will arguably further lead, to an increase of human
rights-related litigation with a cross-border dimension. As a consequence,
human rights will also further influence the interpretation of private international
law. The global and even regional fragmentation of human rights standards will
necessarily turn the courts’ attention to public policy clauses, which permit
human rights concerns to be taken into consideration. In doing so, courts should
not apply public policy clauses restrictively, as the expectations of the parties as
well as principles of comity, mutual recognition and reciprocity do not justify
reduced standards of human rights protection. However, when applying public
policy clauses in the light of human rights, courts have to consider the principle
of proportionality, and, with regard to substantive public policy, also the doctrine
of indirect horizontal effect.
When reviewing the human rights compatibility of the (non-)application of
public policy clauses by courts of Convention states, the ECtHR’s intensity of
judicial scrutiny should distinguish the refusal to apply public policy clauses
against judgments originating from a Convention state from all the other cases
of (non-)application of public policy clauses. While in the first case it has to be
ensured that the Convention’s admissibility rules are not circumvented (the Lind-
berg scenario), the argument that redress to the Strasbourg Court should be sought
against an original judgment does not apply in the other cases.
In the long run, the significance of private international law in human rights-
sensitive cases in general, and the application of public policy clauses in particular,
may only be limited by global harmonisation of substantive human rights protec-
tion. Thus, the application of public policy clauses to protect human rights does
not diminish international coherence in private international law, but rather incen-
tivises the pursuit of global harmonisation of human rights standards. A prudent
use of public policy clauses to protect human rights may thus prepare the
ground for a common human rights ordre public.
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